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Li et al. presented a protocol [Int. Journal of Quantum Information, Vol. 4, No. 6 (2006)
899-906] for quantum key distribution based on entanglement swapping. In this protocol
they use random and certain bits to construct a classical key and they claim that this key
is secure. In our article we show that the protocol by Li et al. is insecure presenting a new
type of attack strategy which gives an adversary full information about the key without
being detected. This strategy is based on entanglement swapping, too, and manages
to preserve the correlation between the measurement results of the legitimate parties.
Further we present a modified version of the protocol and show that it is secure against
this new attack strategy.
Keywords: Quantum Key Distribution, Quantum Cryptography, Entanglement, Entan-
glement Swapping, Attack Strategy
1. Introduction
Entanglement swapping 1 is a phenomenon where 2 or more qubits which didn’t
interact in the past are brought into an entangled state. For example, two par-
ties Alice and Bob share the Bell states |Φ+〉12 and |Φ+〉34 such that Alice is in
possession of qubits 1 and 3 and Bob of qubits 2 and 4. If Alice performs a mea-
surement in the Bell basis on qubits 1 and 3 she will end up with one of the four
Bell states. Simultaneously Bob’s qubits 2 and 4 are also brought into a Bell state.
This measurement can be described by the equation
|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 = 1
2
(
|Φ+〉13|Φ+〉24 + |Φ−〉13|Φ−〉24
+ |Ψ+〉13|Ψ+〉24 + |Ψ−〉13|Ψ−〉24
)
(1)
This equation shows that Alice’s result is completely random, i.e. she will obtain
any of the four Bell states with equal probability. But the state of the qubits 2 and
4 is completely determined by the result of Alice’s measurement. This correlation
is used in a number of key distribution protocols 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 to share a secret key
1
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between Alice and Bob. Since the practical realization of entanglement swapping
is rather complex to achieve with today’s technology none of these QKD protocols
has been implemented yet.
Also Li et al. presented a QKD protocol 9 based on entanglement swapping
which not only produces random key bits but also certain key bits. This is achieved
by introducing a Pauli operation in eq. (1) as it will be described in detail in section
2. As it is shown in 9 this protocol is secure against an intercept/resend attack as
well as a collective attack. But we will present an attack strategy in section 3 which
is based on a 6-qubit state. This state is more complex than the system of the
sender and the receiver, but it provides an adversary with full information about
the key shared between the two parties.
The main idea of this attack is that the adversary Eve entangles herself with
Alice and Bob using a state which preserves the correlations of Alice’s Bell state
measurement. Further this state contains additional information which allows Eve
to eavesdrop Bob’s secret result. An attack where Eve is entangled with one party
was presented by Zhang, Li and Guo 10 on the protocol of Cabello 8 but it wouldn’t
work for the protocol in 9 since Eve wouldn’t stay undetected.
We will also make a proposal how to secure the protocol against this new attack
strategy. This can be achieved using a Hadamard operation and we will describe
the new version in detail in section 4. In section 5 we will discuss the security of
our new version.
2. The Original Protocol
Alice creates 2n EPR pairs, each in a Bell state, e.g. |Φ+〉. In the following we will
focus on the simple case n = 1, where Alice and Bob share the states |Φ+〉12 and
|Φ+〉34, which are publicly known. In 9 Li et al. start the protocol with preshared
entangled states which is a very strong assumption because the qubits have to
be shared somehow between the two parties. But in the security analysis in 9 an
adversary Eve is granted the possibility to interact with the Bell states. Thus we
can conclude that there have to be some qubits in transit between Alice and Bob.
There are two possible ways to share the Bell states between the legitimate parties:
either one party, e.g. Alice, prepares both Bell states and sends two qubits to the
other party or both parties prepare one Bell state and they exchange two qubits.
The first scenario is insecure against a simple intercept-resend attack: If Alice
prepares the Bell states |Φ+〉12 and |Φ+〉34 and sends qubits 2 and 4 to Bob Eve
can intercept these qubits and perform a Bell state measurement on them. This will
bring qubits 1 and 3 also into a Bell state which is known to Eve. Then she forwards
qubits 2 and 4 to Bob. Thus Eve has full information about Alice’s and Bob’s secret
measurement result and is able to eavesdrop the key perfectly. Therefore we will
assume that Alice prepares |Φ+〉12 and Bob prepares |Φ+〉34 and that they exchange
the qubits 2 and 3 (cf. picture (2) in figure 1).
Alice randomly chooses one of the four Pauli operations, I, σx, σy or σz and
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applies it to qubit 1 (cf. picture (3) in figure 1). Alice’s operation will generally be
described as σ
(i)
A , where the superscript (i) denotes that it is applied on qubit i.
As a next step Alice performs a Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and 3 in her
possession (cf. picture (4) in figure 1).
With this measurement the effect of entanglement swapping arises and entangles
Bob’s qubits 2 and 4. Following the equation
σ
(1)
A |Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 =
1
2
(
|Φ+〉13σ(2)A |Φ+〉24 + |Φ−〉13σ(2)A |Φ−〉24
+ |Ψ+〉13σ(2)A |Ψ+〉24 + |Ψ−〉13σ(2)A |Ψ−〉24
)
(2)
Alice can determine in which state Bob’s qubits are after her Bell state measurement
if she applied the operation σA on qubit 1. Additionally, she can compute also what
the state of qubits 2 and 4 would be, if she didn’t apply any operation on qubit 1
using eq. (1) from above. Now Alice announces to Bob that she made a Bell state
measurement but keeps her result secret.
To infere Alice’s result Bob performs a Bell state measurement on qubit 2 and
4 in his possession. Since he does not know yet which operation Alice applied and
in which state qubits 1 and 2 have been before the measurement he does not know
the exact state of qubits 1 and 3. With the help of eq. (1) he can at least deduce
in which state qubits 1 and 3 should be if Alice didn’t apply anything to qubit 1.
Alice Bob
(1)
Alice Bob
(3)
Alice Bob
(5)
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
x
σ
Alice Bob
(4)
34
+Φ
34
+Φ
12
+Ψ
13
−Ψ
24
−Φ
Alice Bob
(2)
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
12
+Φ
Fig. 1. An illustration of the original protocol by Li at al. 9. Here σx is chosen for Alice’s secret
operation and |Ψ−〉13 as Alice’s result of the Bell state measurement.
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This is called Alice’s imaginary result.
To get the correct state of qubits 1 and 3 Bob asks Alice about her result but
keeps his own result secret. Using the information about Alice’s and his own result
Bob can deduce which Pauli operation Alice applied. Alice and Bob now share
information about Alice’s randomly chosen operation and the result Bob obtained,
which is also random. They use these two pieces of information to extract a classical
raw key. Therefore they agree beforehand on a mapping of Bell states onto classical
2-bit strings, e.g.
|Φ+〉 −→ 00 |Φ−〉 −→ 01 |Ψ+〉 −→ 10 |Ψ−〉 −→ 11 (3)
as well as of Pauli operations onto classical 2-bit strings, i.e.
I −→ 00 σx −→ 01 σy −→ 10 σz −→ 11 (4)
If we take the general case with 2n EPR pairs Alice and Bob repeat these steps
for all the pairs. In the end they publicly compare a certain number of bits of the
generated raw key to detect an eavesdropper.
3. A Perfect Attack Strategy
In this section we discuss an attack strategy where Eve is able to perfectly eavesdrop
the secret key of Alice and Bob without being detected. Therefore she uses the six
qubit state (cf. picture (1) in figure 2)
|δ〉PQRSTU = 1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉PQRSTU + |001101〉PQRSTU
+ |010111〉PQRSTU + |011010〉PQRSTU
+ |100110〉PQRSTU + |101011〉PQRSTU
+ |110001〉PQRSTU + |111100〉PQRSTU
)
(5)
This state is rather complex and not easy to generate (cf. appendix) but it has the
special property that it can be written as
|δ〉PQRSTU = 1
2
(
|Φ+〉PR ⊗ |Φ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
+ |Φ−〉PR ⊗ |Φ−〉QS ⊗ |Φ−〉TU
+ |Ψ+〉PR ⊗ |Ψ+〉QS ⊗ |Ψ+〉TU
+ |Ψ−〉PR ⊗ |Ψ−〉QS ⊗ |Ψ−〉TU
)
(6)
That means, a measurement on qubits P and R as well as Q and S yields in the
same result as it would be expected from entanglement swapping in eq. (1). Further
the remaining two qubits T and U are in the same state as the qubits Q and S. Eve
can use this fact to obtain enough information to deduce the secret measurement
results of Alice and Bob if she somehow manages that the two parties share the
state |δ〉 instead of two Bell states. That can be achieved easily using entanglement
swapping on qubits 2 and 3 in transit together with her six qubits.
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When Alice sends out qubit 2 and Bob qubit 3 Eve preforms Bell state mea-
surements on both of them with respective qubits from |δ〉PQRSTU (cf. picture (2)
in figure 2). A problem is that Eve, at first, doesn’t know which initial state Alice
prepared. But, as we will show in the next paragraphs, she can overcome this prob-
lem fairly easy. Eve’s first Bell state measurement on qubits 2 and P is described
in eq. (7). (As already pointed out above, we will use σA to describe Alice’s secret
Pauli operation.)
σ
(1)
A |Φ+〉12 ⊗ |δ〉PQRSTU =
σ
(1)
A
1√
2
(
|00〉12 + |11〉12
)
⊗ 1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉PQRSTU + |001101〉PQRSTU
+ |010111〉PQRSTU + |011010〉PQRSTU + |100110〉PQRSTU
+ |101011〉PQRSTU + |110001〉PQRSTU + |111100〉PQRSTU
)
=
1
2
(
|Φ+〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QRSTU + |001101〉1QRSTU
+ |010111〉1QRSTU + |011010〉1QRSTU + |100110〉1QRSTU
+ |101011〉1QRSTU + |110001〉1QRSTU + |111100〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Φ−〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QRSTU + |001101〉1QRSTU
+ |010111〉1QRSTU + |011010〉1QRSTU − |100110〉1QRSTU
− |101011〉1QRSTU − |110001〉1QRSTU − |111100〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Ψ+〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A
1
2
√
2
(
|000110〉1QRSTU + |001011〉1QRSTU
+ |010001〉1QRSTU + |011100〉1QRSTU + |100000〉1QRSTU
+ |101101〉1QRSTU + |110111〉1QRSTU + |111010〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Ψ−〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A
1
2
√
2
(
|000110〉1QRSTU + |001011〉1QRSTU
+ |010001〉1QRSTU + |011100〉1QRSTU − |100000〉1QRSTU
− |101101〉1QRSTU − |110111〉1QRSTU − |111010〉1QRSTU
))
(7)
At this point Eve can not clearly say which state the qubits 1, Q,R, S, T and U
are in. All four results of her Bell state measurement are equally likely and she
has absolutely no information about the operation σA. Nevertheless, Eve is able to
transform the 6-qubit state in a way that it is always in the state σ
(1)
A |δ〉1QRSTU .
Therefore she performs a σx operation on qubits S and T if she gets |Ψ+〉2P or does
nothing if her result is |Φ+〉2P . To correct the negative signs in case Eve obtains
a |Φ−〉2P she performs a σz on qubits S and U . In case of |Ψ−〉2P she first has to
apply the σx operator on qubits S and T and then the σz operator on qubits S and
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U .
The second Bell state measurement is performed on qubits 3 and S. Again, the
resulting 6-qubit state is not entirely known but it can be one out of four possible
states. We won’t describe this Bell state measurements explicitly but we want to
stress that Eve is able to bring the 6 qubits in the state σ
(1)
A |δ〉1QR4TU . Therefore
she uses a similar method as described above applying the Pauli operations σx and
σz on qubits R, T and U .
Now Eve sends qubit R to Alice and qubit Q to Bob and keeps qubits T and
U by herself (cf. picture (4) in figure 2). Alice and Bob, who are not aware of
Eve’s intervention follow the protocol and perform Bell state measurements on their
respective particles (cf. pictures (5) and (6) in figure 2). If we look at the 6-qubit
state σ
(1)
A |δ〉1QR4TU , Alice’s Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and R changes the
state in a way that it leaves the qubit pairs Q, 4 and T , U in an entangled state.
This can be seen from the alternative description of the state σ
(1)
A |δ〉1QR4TU in eq.
(8) and picture (7) in figure 2).
σ
(1)
A |δ〉1QR4TU =
σ
(1)
A
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QR4TU + |001101〉1QR4TU
+ |010111〉1QR4TU + |011010〉1QR4TU + |100110〉1QR4TU
+ |101011〉1QR4TU + |110001〉1QR4TU + |111100〉1QR4TU
)
=
1
2
(
σ
(1)
A |Φ+〉1R ⊗
1
2
(
|0000〉Q4TU + |0011〉Q4TU
+ |1100〉Q4TU + |1111〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Φ−〉1R ⊗
1
2
(
|0000〉Q4TU − |0011〉Q4TU
− |1100〉Q4TU + |1111〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Ψ+〉1R ⊗
1
2
(
|0101〉Q4TU + |0110〉Q4TU
+ |1001〉Q4TU + |1010〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Ψ−〉1R ⊗
1
2
(
|0101〉Q4TU + |0110〉Q4TU
− |1001〉Q4TU − |1010〉Q4TU
))
(8)
Alice gets each possible result with equal probability of 14 as she would expect
it. Further, Bob’s Bell state measurement will end up with certainty in a specific
Bell state, which is fully dependent on Alice’s result. Due to the special choice
of the state |δ〉 the correlation between his and Alice’s result is preserved as they
would expect it if no eavesdropper was present. Thus the presence of Eve won’t be
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detected when Alice and Bob compare some bits of the raw key. Additionally, it
leaves the qubits T and U , which are in Eve’s possession, in the very same state
Bob obtains as result (cf. also picture (7) in figure 2). This is easy to see if we look
at the alternative description in the Bell basis of the remaining four qubits Q, 4, T
and U after Alice’s measurement
1
2
(
σ
(1)
A |Φ+〉1R ⊗ |Φ+〉Q4 ⊗ |Φ+〉TU + σ(1)A |Φ−〉1R ⊗ |Φ−〉Q4 ⊗ |Φ−〉TU
+σ
(1)
A |Ψ+〉1R ⊗ |Ψ+〉Q4 ⊗ |Ψ+〉TU + σ(1)A |Ψ−〉1R ⊗ |Ψ−〉Q4 ⊗ |Ψ−〉TU
)
(9)
At this time, Eve has full information about Bob’s secret measurement. That
means, Eve has as much information as Bob and thus can obtain the classical secret
raw key in the same way Bob does: From her result of the Bell state measurement
Eve can compute Alice’s imaginary result. Moreover, when Alice publicly announces
her result, Eve is able to infere which Pauli operation Alice has chosen. Thus Eve
knows both parts of the shared secret information. Therefore she easily can infere
the classical bit string which is used as a raw key by Alice and Bob and so she is
able to obtain the secret key, too.
Instead of performing the Bell state measurements on the qubit pairs 2, P and
3, S as soon as she receives them, Eve has the opportunity to delay her measure-
ment and immediately send qubit R to Alice (cf. picture (2) in figure 5). With
this strategy Eve is able to overcome operations Alice applies on qubit 1 but she
introduces a much higher error rate as we will describe in section 5. Another, but
rather strong, assumption is that Eve is in control of Alice’s and Bob’s EPR source.
That means she is able to distribute the state |δ〉PQRSTU between her and the two
parties without further Bell state measurements. In this case Alice’s measurement
on qubits P and R leaves Bob’s qubits in a correlated state and Eve with the full
information about the results, as described above. Since Alice and Bob can prepare
their EPR source themself this assumption is not very practical.
4. The Modified Protocol
The protocol can be improved by performing a Hadamard operation before Alice
applies her secret Pauli operation on qubit 1 (cf. picture (3) in figure 3). The
Hadamard operation alters the initial state in a way that Eve can’t eavesdrop the
secret key without introducing a certain error rate. Thus Alice and Bob can detect
her easily as it will be shown in section 5.
Due to the use of the additional Hadamard operation it is not important any
more wether Alice prepares both Bell states or each party prepares a Bell state
by its own. To stay consistent with the above descriptions of the protocol and the
attack we will discuss the scenario where Alice prepares the state |Φ+〉12 and Bob
prepares |Φ+〉34 (for the simple case n = 1). Alice sends out qubit 2 to Bob and he
sends qubit 3 to Alice. When she receives Bob’s qubit she randomly applies either
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the identity operator I or the Hadamard operator
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(10)
on qubit 1. This alters the initial state to
H(1)|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 = |ω+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 (11)
where |ω+〉12 is one of the four possible superpositions of Bell states, i.e.
H(1)|Φ±〉12 = |ω±〉12 = 1√
2
(
|Φ∓〉12 ± |Ψ±〉12
)
H(1)|Ψ±〉12 = |χ±〉12 = 1√
2
(
|Ψ∓〉12 ± |Φ±〉12
)
(12)
Then Alice applies her secret Pauli operation σA on qubit 1 and performs a Bell
state measurement on qubits 1 and 3 (cf. picture (5) in figure 3). This Bell state
measurement can be described as
|ω+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 = 1
2
(
|Φ+〉13 ⊗ |ω+〉24 + |Φ−〉13 ⊗ |ω−〉24
+ |Ψ+〉13 ⊗ |χ+〉24 + |Ψ−〉13 ⊗ |χ−〉24
)
(13)
Further she publicly tells Bob wether she has applied the H operator or not. If
she did so, Bob applies the H operator on qubit 2 and otherwise he does nothing
(cf. picture (6) in figure 3). As we can see from eq. (12) a repeated application
of the Hadamard operator eliminates the superposition and the correlation from
the original Bell state measurement is preserved. In the end Bob performs a Bell
measurement on qubits 2 and 4 and computes Alice’s actual and imaginary result
as it is described in the original protocol.
5. Security Analysis
In the following we will provide a security analysis of the modified protocol. Since
the application of the Hadamard operation is just a minor change of the original
protocol, the modified version is also secure against an intercept/resend attack as
well as a collective attack, as described in 9. Therefore we will first inspect Eve’s
probability to stay undetected if she follows the same attack strategy just described
in section 3. If Alice does not apply the Hadamard operator Eve’s attack will be
successfull as we already pointed out above. Thus we will discuss the case where
Alice performs the Hadamard operation on qubit 1 (cf. figure 4). Due to the fact
that the Hadamard operation alters the initial state as we have seen in eq. (11)
Eve’s first Bell state measurement on qubits 2 and P will also change as described
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in eq. (14).
σ
(1)
A H
(1)|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |δ〉PQRSTU =
1
2
(
|Φ+〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A H(1)
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QRSTU + |001101〉1QRSTU
+ |010111〉1QRSTU + |011010〉1QRSTU + |100110〉1QRSTU
+ |101011〉1QRSTU + |110001〉1QRSTU + |111100〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Φ−〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A H(1)
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QRSTU + |001101〉1QRSTU
+ |010111〉1QRSTU + |011010〉1QRSTU − |100110〉1QRSTU
− |101011〉1QRSTU − |110001〉1QRSTU − |111100〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Ψ+〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A H(1)
1
2
√
2
(
|000110〉1QRSTU + |001011〉1QRSTU
+ |010001〉1QRSTU + |011100〉1QRSTU + |100000〉1QRSTU
+ |101101〉1QRSTU + |110111〉1QRSTU + |111010〉1QRSTU
)
+ |Ψ−〉2P ⊗ σ(1)A H(1)
1
2
√
2
(
|000110〉1QRSTU + |001011〉1QRSTU
+ |010001〉1QRSTU + |011100〉1QRSTU − |100000〉1QRSTU
− |101101〉1QRSTU − |110111〉1QRSTU − |111010〉1QRSTU
))
(14)
Alice Bob
(1)
Eve
Alice Bob
(3)
Eve Alice BobEve
Alice BobEve
Alice BobEve
(4)
(5) (6)
12
+Φ
(7)
34
+Φ
PQRSTU
δ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
TU
−Φ
Alice Bob
(2)
Eve
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
PQRSTU
δ
x
σ
S3
+Φ
TUQR41
δ
TUQR41
δ
TUQR41
δ
S3
+Φ
S3
+Φ
S3
+Φ 4Q
−Φ
R1
−Ψ
Alice BobEve
P2
+Φ
TUQR41
δ
S3
+Φ
Fig. 2. An illustration of the new attack strategy described in section 3. Again σx is chosen as
Alice’s secret operation and |Ψ−〉1R as Alice’s result of the Bell state measurement.
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As it has been shown in section 3 Eve is able to change the resulting states of her
measurements such that she will always end up with a slight variation of her initial
state. A similar argument holds for Eve’s second measurement on qubits 3 and S.
Thus the state after these two measurements is (cf. picture (6) in figure 4)
|δ′〉1QR4TU = σ(1)A H(1)|δ〉1QR4TU (15)
Then Eve sends out qubit R to Alice and qubit Q to Bob. When Alice performs
her Bell state measurement the state |δ′〉1QR4TU can be described as in eq. (16) (cf.
also picture (7) in figure 4).
σ
(1)
A H
(1)|δ〉1QR4TU =
σ
(1)
A H
(1) 1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉1QR4TU + |001101〉1QR4TU
+ |010111〉1QR4TU + |011010〉1QR4TU + |100110〉1QR4TU
+ |101011〉1QR4TU + |110001〉1QR4TU + |111100〉1QR4TU
)
=
1
2
(
σ
(1)
A |Φ+〉1R ⊗
1
2
√
2
(
|0000〉Q4TU − |0011〉Q4TU
− |1100〉Q4TU + |1111〉Q4TU + |0101〉Q4TU
+ |0110〉Q4TU + |1001〉Q4TU + |1010〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Φ−〉1R ⊗
1
2
√
2
(
|0000〉Q4TU + |0011〉Q4TU
+ |1100〉Q4TU + |1111〉Q4TU − |0101〉Q4TU
+ |0110〉Q4TU + |1001〉Q4TU − |1010〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Ψ+〉1R ⊗
1
2
√
2
(
|0101〉Q4TU − |0110〉Q4TU
− |1001〉Q4TU + |1010〉Q4TU + |0000〉Q4TU
+ |0011〉Q4TU + |1100〉Q4TU + |1111〉Q4TU
)
+ σ
(1)
A |Ψ−〉1R ⊗
1
2
√
2
(
|0101〉Q4TU + |0110〉Q4TU
+ |1001〉Q4TU + |1010〉Q4TU − |0000〉Q4TU
+ |0011〉Q4TU + |1100〉Q4TU − |1111〉Q4TU
))
(16)
For reasons of simplicity we will assume that Alice’s result is σ
(1)
A |Φ−〉1R as it
is illustrated in picture (8) in figure 4 (the computations for any other result are
analog). Bob also applies the Hadamard operator on qubit Q in his possession and
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thus alters the state of qubits Q, 4, T and U to
1
4
(
|0000〉Q4TU + |1000〉Q4TU + |0011〉Q4TU + |1011〉Q4TU
+ |0100〉Q4TU − |1100〉Q4TU + |0111〉Q4TU − |1111〉Q4TU
− |0101〉Q4TU − |1101〉Q4TU + |0110〉Q4TU + |1110〉Q4TU
+ |0001〉Q4TU − |1001〉Q4TU − |0010〉Q4TU + |1010〉Q4TU
)
(17)
which can be alternatively written as
1√
2
(
|Φ−〉Q4 ⊗ |ω−〉TU + |Ψ+〉Q4 ⊗ |χ+〉TU
)
(18)
From this it is easy to see that Bob will get the expected result, |Φ−〉Q4 only with
50% probability. In the other half of the cases he will obtain |Ψ+〉Q4. Alice and Bob
will detect this error when they check the correlation between their results.
Alice Bob
(1)
Alice Bob
(3)
Alice Bob
(5)
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
x
σ
Alice Bob
(4)
34
+Φ
34
+Φ
13
−Ψ
24
−Φ
Alice Bob
(2)
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
(6)
Alice Bob
H
34
+Φ
12
+Φ
12
+ω
12
+χ
Alice Bob
13
−Ψ (7)
H
24
−ω
Fig. 3. An illustration of the modified protocol presented in section 4. Alice performs the
Hadamard operation before she applies her secret operation σx. Again, |Ψ−〉13 is assumed to
be Alice’s result of the Bell state measurement.
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That means in 12 of the cases, when Alice doesn’t apply the Hadamard opera-
tion, Eve will stay undetected with certainty. In the other half of the cases when
Alice performs the Hadamard transformation on qubit 1 Eve will be detected with
probability 12 . These probabilities are valid for the simple case (n = 1) where Alice
and Bob share only 2 Bell states. In general, Alice and Bob share 2n entangled
qubit pairs and then they will detect Eve with the probability
p = 1−
(
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
)n
= 1−
(
3
4
)n
(19)
which can be brought close to 1 for large n.
A possibility for Eve to overcome the effect of the Hadamard operation is to
apply a H operation herself on the qubits P and Q before the protocol starts. This
changes the initial state |δ〉PQRSTU to H(P )H(Q)|δ〉PQRSTU and in the course of
the protocol Alice and Bob’s application of the Hadamard operator will invert Eve’s
operations. In detail, eq. 15 changes to
|δ′〉1QR4TU = σ(1)A H(1)H(1)H(Q)|δ〉1QR4TU = σ(1)A H(Q)|δ〉1QR4TU (20)
and further, after Bob’s application of the Hadamard operation
H(Q)|δ′〉1QR4TU = σ(1)A H(Q)H(Q)|δ〉1QR4TU = σ(1)A |δ〉1QR4TU (21)
which is equal to the state from eq. 8. Thus, the attack reduces to the version
described in section 3 and Eve will obtain full information about the key whenever
Alice decides to perform the H operation. In all the other cases Eve will introduce
an error equal to eq. 19 due to her Hadamard operations, which is easy to see
following the arguments in the paragraphs above. At this point we want to stress
that Alice and Bob will become suspicious if they find errors only in those cases
when Alice does (or does not, respectively) perform the Hadamard operation. Thus,
a better strategy for Eve is to randomly apply the two Hadamard operations on
qubits P and Q. She will introduce the same error rate but the errors will be equally
distributed.
Another option for Eve to invert Alice’s Hadamard operation is to delay her mea-
surement on the qubit pairs 2, P and 3, S until Alice publicly announces whether
she applied the Hadamard operation or not. That means, Eve intercepts qubits 2
and 3 in transit between Alice and Bob and immediately forwards qubit R to Alice
(cf. picture (2) in figure 5). Alice, convinced to have received Bob’s qubit, applies
the Hadamard operation and performs the Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and
R (cf. pictures (3)-(5) in figure 5). Due to entanglement swapping qubit 2 is now
December 14, 2018 9:15 Novel˙Attack˙Strategy
13
entangled with qubits P , Q, S, T and U , as described in eq. 22.
σ
(1)
A H
(1)|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |δ〉PQRSTU =
1
2
(
|Φ+〉1R ⊗ σ(P )A H(2)
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉PQ2STU + |001101〉PQ2STU
+ |010111〉PQ2STU + |011010〉PQ2STU + |100110〉PQ2STU
+ |101011〉PQ2STU + |110001〉PQ2STU + |111100〉PQ2STU
)
+ |Φ−〉1R ⊗ σ(P )A H(2)
1
2
√
2
(
|000000〉PQ2STU − |001101〉PQ2STU
+ |010111〉PQ2STU − |011010〉PQ2STU + |100110〉PQ2STU
− |101011〉PQ2STU + |110001〉PQ2STU − |111100〉PQ2STU
)
+ |Ψ+〉1R ⊗ σ(P )A H(2)
1
2
√
2
(
|000101〉PQ2STU + |001000〉PQ2STU
+ |010010〉PQ2STU + |011111〉PQ2STU + |100011〉PQ2STU
+ |101110〉PQ2STU + |110100〉PQ2STU + |111001〉PQ2STU
)
+ |Ψ−〉1R ⊗ σ(P )A H(2)
1
2
√
2
(
|000101〉PQ2STU − |001000〉PQ2STU
+ |010010〉PQ2STU − |011111〉PQ2STU + |100011〉PQ2STU
− |101110〉PQ2STU + |110100〉PQ2STU − |111001〉PQ2STU
))
(22)
Here, Eve does not know in which state her qubits 2, P , Q, S, T and U are be-
cause she does not know Alice’s result. But for our further considerations we assume
that Alice’s result is |Ψ−〉1R, i.e. Eve is in possession of some state σ(P )A |δ′〉PQ2STU
similar to her initial state |δ〉PQ2STU . Next, Alice publicly announces that she ap-
plied the Hadamard operation. Having that knowledge Eve applies a H operation
on qubits 2 and Q in her possession inverting the effect of Alice H operation and
preparing for Bob’s H operation (cf. picture (7) in figure 5). Then she sends qubit
Q to Bob and performs a Bell state measurement on qubits 3 and S which changes
the state to σ
(P )
A |δ′〉PQ24TU . Finally, Bob inverts the Hadamard operation due to
Alice’s public announcement (cf. picture (8) in figure 5). Similar to eq. 8 Bob’s Bell
state measurement on qubits Q and 4 can be described as
σ
(P )
A |δ′〉PQ24TU =
1
2
(
− |Φ+〉Q4 ⊗ |Φ−〉P2 ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
− |Φ−〉Q4 ⊗ |Φ+〉P2 ⊗ |Φ−〉TU
+ |Ψ+〉Q4 ⊗ |Ψ−〉P2 ⊗ |Ψ+〉TU
+ |Ψ−〉Q4 ⊗ |Ψ+〉P2 ⊗ |Ψ−〉TU
)
(23)
It is easy to see that Bob’s obtains every Bell state with equal probability of 25%,
i.e. his and Alice’s results are completely uncorrelated. In case Alice does not apply
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the Hadamard operation Eve will introduce the same error rate. Therefore, the
probability Eve will be detected is
p = 1−
(
1
2
· 1
4
+
1
2
· 1
4
)n
= 1−
(
1
4
)n
(24)
which converges much faster to 1 compared to the first strategy described above
(cf. eq. 19).
6. Conclusion
We showed that the protocol presented by Li et al. 9 is open to an attack strategy
where Eve entangles herself with both legitimate communication parties. Using a
Alice Bob
(1)
Eve
Alice Bob
(3)
Eve Alice BobEve
Alice BobEve
Alice BobEve
(4)
(5) (6)
12
+Φ
(7)
34
+Φ
PQRSTU
δ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
P2
+Φ
Alice Bob
(2)
Eve
12
+Φ
34
+Φ
PQRSTU
δ
S3
+Φ
TUQR41
δ
TUQR41
δ
S3
+Φ
S3
+Φ
S3
+ΦR1
−Ψ
(8)
(9)
H
H xσ
Alice BobEve
P2
+Φ
S3
+Φ
Alice BobEve
P2
+Φ
TUQR41
δ
S3
+Φ
Alice BobEve
P2
+Φ
S3
+ΦR1
−Ψ
4Q
+χ
4Q
+Ψ
4Q
+χ
4Q
+χ
TUQR41
δ ′
TUQR41
δ ′
Fig. 4. An illustration of the attack on the modified protocol as described in section 5. Eve
follows the strategy presented in section 3 and Alice has chosen to apply the Hadamard operation.
Again, σx is Alice’s secret operation and |Ψ−〉1R is Alice’s result of the Bell state measurement.
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special 6-qubit state which preserves the correlated results of entanglement swap-
ping an adversary is able to obtain full information about the key Alice and Bob
share in the end. We also discussed an improvement where Alice uses a Hadamard
transformation on one qubit to secure the protocol. We showed that due to the
change of the initial state caused by the Hadamard operation an adversary will be
detected with a high probability.
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Appendix. Generation of Eve’s Initial State
Eve’s initial state |δ〉PQRSTU from eq. (5) is rather complex and it might not be
producible due to today’s physical limitations. Nevertheless, we can show that it is,
in principle, possible for Eve to generate this state using a sequence of Hadamard
operations and controlled Pauli operations.
First we assume that Eve is in possession of 3 sources emitting Bell states. The
state of these 6 qubits is
|Φ−〉PR ⊗ |Φ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU (25)
Eve performs a Hadamard operation H on qubits P and Q (indicated by the su-
perscripts (P ) and (Q)), which alters the initial state first to
H(P )|Φ−〉PR ⊗ |Φ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU (26)
and further to
H(P )|Φ−〉PR ⊗H(Q)|Φ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU =
1
2
(
|Φ+〉PR ⊗ |Φ−〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU + |Φ+〉PR ⊗ |Ψ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
− |Ψ−〉PR ⊗ |Φ−〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU − |Ψ−〉PR ⊗ |Ψ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
)
(27)
Then Eve applies a σz operation on qubit Q if qubits P and R are in the Bell state
|Φ+〉PR. Otherwise the identity operator is applied. This action can be described
as
|Φ+〉〈Φ+| ⊗ σz ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I + |Φ−〉〈Φ−| ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I
+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I − |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I ⊗ I (28)
and it changes the state to
1
2
(
|Φ+〉PR ⊗ |Φ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU + |Φ+〉PR ⊗ |Ψ−〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
+ |Ψ−〉PR ⊗ |Φ−〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU + |Ψ−〉PR ⊗ |Ψ+〉QS ⊗ |Φ+〉TU
)
(29)
Next Eve performs a σx operation on qubit P and a σz on qubit T if qubits Q and
S are in the state |Φ−〉QS . Alternatively, she performs a σz operation on qubit P
and a σx operation on qubit T if qubits qubits Q and S are in the state |Ψ+〉QS . If
qubits Q and S are in the state |Ψ−〉QS Eve applies a iσy operation on both qubits
P and T . These three controlled operation can be stated as
I ⊗ I ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+| ⊗ I ⊗ I + σx ⊗ I ⊗ |Φ−〉〈Φ−| ⊗ σz ⊗ I
+ σz ⊗ I ⊗ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| ⊗ σx ⊗ I + iσy ⊗ I ⊗ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| ⊗ iσy ⊗ I (30)
Using this operator Eve is able to bring the 6 qubits into the desired state from eq.
(5).
December 14, 2018 9:15 Novel˙Attack˙Strategy
17
References
1. M. Zukowski, Z. A., M. Horne, and A. K. Ekert, “”Event-Ready-Detectors” Bell
State Measurement via Entanglement Swapping,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 71, no. 26,
pp. 4287–4290, 1993.
2. J. Wang, Q. Zhang, and C.-J. Tang, “Quantum Key Distribution Protocols using
Entangled State,” quant-ph/0510208 v3, 2005.
3. A. Cabello, “Addendum to ”Quantum Key Distribution without Alternative Mea-
surements”,” quant-ph/0009051 v3, 2001.
4. C. Li, H.-S. Song, L. Zhou, and C.-F. Wu, “A Random Quantum Key Distribution
Achieved by using Bell States,” J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt., vol. 5, pp.
155–157, 2003.
5. F. Gao, F. Guo, Q. Wen, and F. Zhu, “Quantum Key Distribution without Alternative
Measurements and Rotations,” quant-ph/0511130, 2005.
6. A. Cabello, “Quantum Key Distribution without Alternative Measurements,” quant-
ph/9911025 v2, 2000.
7. D. Song, “Secure Key Distribution by Swapping Quantum Entanglement,” quant-
ph/0305168 v3, 2004.
8. A. Cabello, “Multiparty Key Distribution and Secret Sharing Based on Entanglement
Swapping,” quant-ph/0009025, 2000.
9. C. Li, Z. Wang, C.-F. Wu, H.-S. Song, and L. Zhou, “Certain Quantum Key Distribu-
tion achieved by using Bell States,” International Journal of Quantum Information,
vol. 4, no. 6, 2006.
10. Y.-S. Zhang, C.-F. Li, and G.-C. Guo, “Comment on ”Quantum Key Distribution
without Alternative Measurements”,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 63, p. 036301, 2001.
